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HAB Capstone Thesis 
Dr. Strunk 




 In 2005, after decades of civil war, the people of South Sudan were victorious against the 
northern Republic of Sudan and created their own autonomous government.  They followed the 
modern trend of instituting democratic elections and a presidential system, with a bicameral 
legislature and an independent judiciary.  The young regime employed all the building blocks of 
a modern stable democracy.  By 2011, South Sudan declared its full independence from the 
Republic of Sudan.  The country was admitted to the United Nations and internationally 
recognized as Africa’s newest state. 
 But the stability and legitimacy of this auspicious beginning quickly deteriorated.  Within 
two years, ethnic tensions turned into outright conflict, the President and Vice President led 
armies against each other, and all the stability that a democratic regime was expected to offer 
was nowhere to be found. 
 South Sudan’s case of democratic failure is not unique.  Many countries all over the 
world have made attempts to discard an old regime and install a democracy, to varying degrees 
of success.  Some democratic regimes have brought stable peace to their countries and freedom 
to their citizens; others have sputtered out almost instantly, or flipped back and forth between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes over the years.  Although democracy is currently the most 
preferred form of government for its guarantee of mutual peace and stability, its track record 
over the past century has been noticeably spotty.  South Sudan is only the most recent example 
of democracy not meeting expectations; other countries in different regions with different 




 Why do so many democratic states fail?  It is not difficult to find convenient answers 
specific to South Sudan to explain the collapse of its state.  The country’s lack of resources and 
historical ethnic divisions are clearly the immediate causes of the conflict and famine ravaging 
South Sudan.  However, the widespread preference for democracy is based in part on the fact 
that its institutions should be able to withstand such transient hardships.  Perhaps ethnic warfare 
was inevitable in South Sudan, but the democratic institutions put in place are supposed to be 
able to weather and maybe even ameliorate such disruptive situations.  If this sort of 
governmental failure was a singular event, then perhaps it could be attributed to a sort of perfect 
storm of factors that no regime could stand against.  Since South Sudan is only one of many such 
young democracies that have failed soon after their inception, it might be time to look past the 
specific circumstantial factors and consider whether the democratic institutions themselves might 
bear some of the fault. 
 Humanity’s preference for democratic institutions is a very recent phenomenon.  With 
only a few exceptions, most governments throughout history have been built around a strict 
hierarchy of authority that was relatively independent of the general populace.  The focus of such 
government was on maintaining the cohesion of the state, and it was less concerned with 
respecting the opinions and rights of citizens.  With the spread of liberalism and its 
individualistic view of society, the popularity of a form of government that placed those rights on 
a pedestal greatly increased.  By making the governing hierarchy accountable to the people, 
democracy provided a simple way to ensure that more attention and care was given to individual 
citizens of a society. 
 But did that liberalism come at a price?  It would seem that democracy, in focusing 
attention on the will of the people, may lose some of the ability of previous forms of government 
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to maintain the cohesion of the state as a whole.  Though everyone enjoys the freedom of action 
allowed by liberal democracy, at some point the act of governing still requires certain people to 
have the authority to tell others what to do.  To compromise, pure democracy is usually tempered 
into a representative republic, in which officials are ultimately dependent on the voters for their 
positions, but can operate relatively independently to maintain the state once in office.  This 
republican model seems to succeed in balancing the desire for liberty and the need for authority, 
and so has become the staple regime type for new countries seeking a state that is both desirable 
and effective. 
 
The Usual Suspects: Demagoguery and Tyranny of the Majority 
 Although the election of public officials by the people is intended to give the people a say 
in how they are governed, such a system places a large burden on the populace to select a good 
leader.  One way in which the populace can fail to select a beneficent leader is by electing a 
demagogue, a leader who achieves political power through general popularity alone.  By 
appealing to the base concerns of the general population, a demagogue can achieve a large base 
of support and thus become a highly legitimate leader from a democratic standpoint.  But being 
popular does not necessarily correlate to being a good leader.  On the one hand, once in power, 
demagogues have the opportunity to ignore the pleas of the masses and use their new authority to 
enact self-serving policies, reducing the liberty of the people in the process.  On the other hand, a 
demagogue might follow through with their popular policy proposals, tearing apart the 
foundational institutions of the state and reducing its cohesive authority.  Both of these are worst 
case scenarios; there is always the possibility that a populist leader could carefully maintain both 
the people’s freedom and the government’s authority.  But if a demagogue turns out to be a bad 
4 
 
leader, there is not much that the people can do in response.  The leader was very legitimately 
elected, and the people must wait until the next election cycle to respond to the leader’s 
transgressions. 
 Another issue of placing the burden of government on the people is that they will attempt 
to use their political power to serve their own ends.  When citizens vote, they have no reason to 
vote in any way that contradicts their own apparent interest.  Since voting operates in such a way 
that the proposal with the most votes is interpreted as representative of the general desire of the 
people, those citizens who voted against the proposal have had their political wills essentially 
nullified.  This phenomenon, the tyranny of the majority, can be seen at the level of the 
legislative assembly as well.  In a two-party system, the political party possessing the majority of 
the seats has almost unchecked power, while the minority party can only vainly express their 
stances before being voted against every time.  On a larger scale, the inherent winner-vs-loser 
aspect of voting systems creates a situation in which a large class of people can enact policies 
which exploit a slightly smaller class of people, and the interests of the smaller class can be 
ignored with impunity. 
 Demagoguery and the tyranny of the majority are two of the most apparent weaknesses of 
a democratic system, and democracies throughout history have taken steps to avoid such 
problems through structural systems of checks and balances.  The voting power of factions and 
individuals can be diluted in various ways, minorities can be protected by bills of rights and 
proportional representation, and the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers can 
prevent any single leader or government branch from centralizing large amounts of government 
authority in themselves.  The problems of voting and democratic rule are so evident that nearly 
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every democratic state has instituted some variation of these checks and balances to prevent such 
institutional flaws from damaging the democracy. 
 Yet modern democracies still fail at an alarming rate.  Are the institutional checks and 
balances failing to prevent some of the expected issues with governments based on popular 
voting?  Or is there some other cause of failure outside of the institutional structures themselves? 
 
A Philosophical Consideration of Democratic Failure 
 To examine these questions, I have decided to analyze several cases of democratic forms 
of government and determine how well they dealt with the expected problems of voting-based 
governments and how they were or were not able to maintain the cohesion of such a government. 
 I will be comparing a few examples of failed modern democracies with arguably 
history’s longest lasting democratic government: the Roman Republic.  While longevity does not 
guarantee an ethically good regime, it does suggest that the regime was able to resist becoming 
so unbearable that was overthrown by its citizens or so weak that it was toppled by external 
threats.  In this way, longevity can signal an effective balance between government authority and 
citizens’ freedom, and thus it will be used as a measure of a successful regime.  Despite the 
eventual fall of the Republic, its stability over nearly five centuries of existence makes it as close 
to a success story as can be found in the real world. 
 Unlike the gradual democratization of many successful modern Western democracies, the 
Roman Republic transformed particularly suddenly from a monarchy to democracy.  The 
beginnings of many failed modern democracies bear much more resemblance to the sudden birth 
of the Roman Republic than to the slow introduction of democracy in countries such as America.  
Though America would be an obvious choice for a case study about democracy and freedom, it 
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does not fit the particular paradigm that I have chosen to investigate; while Rome and the two 
failed modern democracies set up democratic institutions practically from scratch, America was 
built on a foundation laid by centuries of British democratic reforms. 
 Although separated by over two thousand years of political and philosophical 
developments, the basic governing structures of both the Republic and modern democracies are 
remarkably similar, and had to confront similar difficulties.  All of the governments in question 
possessed checks and balances, a mixed constitution, and participation by the citizenry, while 
dealing with remnants of foreign rule and warring neighboring nations.  Yet the modern 
democratic governments fell apart after no more than a decade or two, while the Roman 
Republic was able to sustain its institutions for half a millennium.  What did the Republic do 
differently than the modern democracies in its early years that could account for such longevity? 
 The most relevant differences between the Republic and modern democracies may turn 
out to be their specific conceptions of liberty and its relevance to democratic institutions.  Both 
make the freedom of the individual a priority of the government, but to different degrees and by 
different means.  In the first two chapters, I will explain how their different approaches to 
balancing individual liberty and governmental authority allowed the Roman Republic to succeed 
and several modern democracies to fail as sustainable forms of government. 
 The final chapter will look back at the issues of democracy through a philosophical lens.  
Though an overwhelming number of philosophers throughout history have written about the 
ideas of freedom and democracy, I have chosen to focus on the two thinkers whom I believe are 
most relevant to my comparison of ancient and modern democracies: Aristotle and John Stuart 
Mill.  Aristotle provides a thorough consideration of government forms in the ancient world, at a 
time when democracy was not viewed as favorably as it is today.  Mill writes at a time when 
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liberal democracy is just beginning to be recognized as a triumph of human achievement, and he 
considers such representative government to be the best possible government form.  Despite their 
contrasting historical perspectives, Aristotle and Mill are connected by their belief that the 
purpose, or telos, of government is what determines its success.  By looking at various 
democratic institutions and underlying philosophical theories, this paper will consider the 
relationship of democracy and freedom with regards to the best form of government. 
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Chapter One: Roman Liberty 
“Quirites, regem create!” 
 After the death of its founder Romulus, the Roman throne lay empty.  With no 
established plan for succession, the hundred senators decided to split themselves into ten 
“decuries,” with one senator chosen from each decury to wield the power of a king.  These ten 
interreges exercised their authority in rotating shifts: each one was granted unlimited power for a 
span of five days at a time.  This distribution of power continued for a full year, but eventually 
the Roman people began to chafe under what they called a “multiplied slavery, a hundred men 
made masters instead of one.” (Livy, 1.17)  In anticipation of the growing discontent, the Senate 
freely bestowed on the people the power to elect their own king.  Livy describes the populace as 
so grateful for the ability to choose their own monarch that they immediately voted to give such 
authority back to the Senate. 
 Under the guidance of the Senate, the Roman monarch continued to be elected by the 
people for the next several generations.  The last popularly-elected king, Tarquinius Priscus, 
even went so far as to campaign for the position and give stump speeches to earn the favor of the 
crowd. (Livy, 1.35)  This democratic system seems to have been pleasing to the people and an 
effective form of government for two centuries, until the final king seized his throne by force and 
without election. 
 But even when they were under the rule of the benevolent, democratically-elected 
monarchs, Livy asserts that the Roman people were not free.  Their dissatisfaction with the 
interregnum rule of the decuries may have been a foreshadowing of future desires for freedom, 
but at the same time, the Roman people wanted to consolidate power into a single person, the 
opposite of the eventual Republican trend of distributing power.  Livy dismisses the people’s 
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petition to restore the unitary monarchy through election as naïve, attributing their desire for 
election to the fact that they had “not yet experienced the sweetness of liberty.” (Livy, 1.17)  
Livy seems to consider popular elections to be an insufficient instrument of freedom when 
viewed in relation to some more general and preferable concept of liberty. 
 The shift from rule by ten unelected interreges to rule by a single elected king seems like 
both a step toward liberty and a step away from it; the Roman people gained the ability to choose 
who governs them, but lost the distribution of power inherent in the five-day shifts of the 
interreges.  Admittedly, the desire for change might have been born out of frustration at the 
inconstancy of having a different executive leader every week, rather than from a budding desire 
for political efficacy; as Livy notes, the people were quite willing to renounce their newfound 
right to vote after the Senate assured them that the unitary monarchy would be restored.  
Whatever the motivations of the Roman people under the monarchy, the juxtaposition of free 
elections and a single supreme ruler raises many questions about the Roman concept of liberty 
and how it was translated into their political institutions. 
 
Two Types of Freedom 
 After considering the distinctive government of the Roman monarchy, it would seem that 
there exist two different concepts of freedom which are not mutually necessary.  On the one 
hand, there is the freedom to participate in government.  The ability to gain political office, serve 
on a jury, and have a say in the creation and enforcement of laws are all aspects of this type of 
freedom.  On the other hand, there is freedom from the tyranny of government.  Systems of 
checks and balances, the separation of power, and guarantees of individual rights comprise this 
concept of freedom. 
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 There seem to be some apparent overlaps between the two conceptual freedoms; for 
example, free individual expression can be both a tool for civic participation as well as a right 
that might need to be protected from governmental overreach.  However, Berlin, in his essay 
“Two Concepts of Liberty,” claims that there is no necessary connection between freedom from 
tyranny (which he calls negative freedom) and freedom to govern oneself (positive freedom).  He 
explains that a “liberal-minded despot” might very well allow his subjects plenty of rights and 
freedom to do as they please, though they have no say in how the nation is governed.1  Berlin 
takes this separation of the two types of freedom to its logical conclusion: “For the ‘positive’ 
sense of liberty comes to light if we try to answer the question, not ‘What am I free to do or be?’, 
but ‘By whom am I ruled?’ …the connection between democracy and individual liberty is a good 
deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both.”2 
 The Roman people under the monarchy possessed the right to vote for their king, a 
rudimentary form of the freedom to participate in government.  Livy, however, denies that the 
people were free to any degree before the founding of the Republic.  What, then, is the Roman 
idea of liberty that Livy believes to be lacking under the monarchy?  And how does the transition 
to Republic fulfill his vision of freedom? 
 
The Importance of Imperium 
 Two ideas at the root of Roman sociopolitical institutions must be defined.  The first is 
imperium.  At its simplest, it is the power to rule over others.  This idea was present from the 
very beginning of Roman government, since there can be no government without an ability to 
execute the law and maintain the existence of the state.  While every government has some such 
                                                 




basic principle of rule over others, the uniquely Roman aspect of imperium was its limitlessness.  
He who possessed imperium was above the law, and was “over all people and all causes 
supreme.”3 
 The basis of this unconditional authority can be found in the ancient customary 
designation of paterfamilias: the father of a Roman family held the power of life and death over 
the rest of his household, and was expected to rule over them responsibly.  Since the first of these 
patres became the first senators, it made sense to the Romans that the Senate should hold 
fatherly power over the Roman nation.  This is the first of many examples of how the Roman 
state is more of a reflection of the familial and social relations of the Roman community than the 
product of abstract political theorizing.  Maintaining the analogy to the paterfamilias, the Senate 
placed their collective authority into the king, ensuring the absolute power of a single father of 
the nation.  For both the monarchy and most of the Republic, the Senate is the ultimate 
receptacle of imperium.  When the individual executive holder of imperium (whether king, 
consul, or emperor) dies or otherwise loses his authority, the imperium goes back to the Senate.  
As seen in the opening anecdote of this chapter, keeping imperium in the hands of the senators 
can only ever be a short-term solution.  Just as it is hard to govern a family by committee, so the 
Romans accepted the fact that government simply works better when imperium is consolidated 
into as few individuals as possible at a time.  Even after the monarchy was dismantled, imperium 
continued to be granted to usually no more individuals than the two consuls (and sometimes only 
to one, in the case of dictators), though with strict term length limits.  Whatever the political 
situation, some individual or group had to possess imperium at the risk of the entire government 
falling apart.  Thus, even at its weakest moments in Roman political history, the Senate still 
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retained the final possession of imperium so as to ensure the continuing stability of the Roman 
state. 
 Although such unconditional authority could be and was abused, the Romans seemed to 
trust an imperium-based government because of its effective management of the nation and its 
similarities to Roman familial relations.  Since imperium is so intertwined with the existence of 
the state itself, it is easier to understand why the Romans accepted a monarchical system for so 
long despite its tyrannical disadvantages.  For a fledgling city-state like Rome, survival is the 
highest priority, and granting unlimited authority to the government enables the administration to 
more quickly and efficiently respond to potentially nation-ending disasters.  There would be 
much less concern for individual rights when there is a significant risk of losing a secure territory 
for the community.  Some minor oppression was most likely seen as an acceptable price to pay 
for stability and security. 
 After two centuries of monarchy, however, the need for unfettered power in the hands of 
a single man lost its existential edge.  With Rome now an established kingdom with less risk of 
being suddenly annihilated, its citizens may have begun to see the unchecked nature of the king’s 
power as less necessary.  One of the primary purposes of imperium, to prevent Rome from being 
conquered by a foreign power, could also have been thrown into question by the presence of 
foreign Etruscan rulers on the Roman throne in the latter half of the monarchy.  When those 
same foreign rulers began to disregard the electoral process and use violence against their own 
citizens to maintain their power, imperium began to seem insufficient as the sole governing 
principle of the nation. 
 With that theory in mind, it would seem that the end of the monarchy was a long time 
coming, despite its portrayal in literature as an unexpected and quite sudden sort of revolution.  
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Livy portrays Lucius Junius Brutus’s ousting of the last king as a rather spontaneous event, with 
Brutus so overcome with emotion at the rape of Lucretia that he suddenly decides to overthrow 
the entire governing system.  The strangeness of his actions is emphasized by the reactions of his 
friends, “wondering at the marvelous situation, whence arose a new character in the chest of 
Brutus.” (Livy, 1.59)  If we are to believe that the Tarquin family’s oppressive actions, of which 
the rape of Lucretia seems to have been the final straw, were the sole motivation for Brutus’s 
uprising, then it would seem reasonable for him to simply depose the Tarquins and initiate an 
election for a new king.  Instead he goes further, ending the whole institution of the monarchy 
and establishing an entirely new system of government, complete with a public oath to never 
have a king ever again.  Though rage may supply the weapons, revising a political system takes a 
calmer mind; Brutus probably did not suddenly invent the idea of a republic upon seeing 
Lucretia’s corpse.  Such liberal aspirations must have been brewing for quite some time, and it 
would seem that Brutus’s greater accomplishment was the recognition of the perfect 
sociopolitical moment to make significant changes to Rome’s relationship with imperium.  
Lucretia’s death and Tarquin’s temporary absence from the city allowed Brutus to capitalize on 
the citizens’ latent outrage and peacefully adjust the employment of imperium in Roman 
government. 
 
Libertas of the State 
 At this moment in Roman history, imperium becomes tempered by a second governing 
principle: libertas.  Both Livy and Tacitus state that Brutus established libertas concurrently with 
the Republic, as if the concept of freedom did not exist in the Roman consciousness before the 
Republic. (Livy 2.1, Tacitus Ann. 1.1)  More accurately, it would seem that Brutus is the one 
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who decided that imperium is no longer so valuable to the Roman state that there is no room for 
libertas. 
 But what is libertas?  At its most simplistic, it describes freedom from a master.  From 
Tacitus’ perspective, it entails both the negative and positive aspects of liberty: freedom from 
being ruled as well as freedom to participate in ruling.4  This absolute definition would place 
libertas directly at odds with imperium; there cannot be one person ruling over another if 
everyone is free from being ruled by anyone else.  Since the two concepts are incompatible as 
absolute principles, and imperium is necessary for the survival of the state, it becomes very easy 
for a young Rome to choose imperium as the founding principle and not give libertas a second 
thought. 
 But as the benefits of imperium gradually decreased, its cost (measured in oppression, or 
lack of libertas) increased, until Brutus took the opportunity to place the two concepts on 
separate spectra in the Republic.  He did not replace imperium with libertas; to do so would have 
dismantled the government and might have reduced the scope of political authority to individual 
families and tribes, back to the original paterfamilias.  Brutus maintained imperium, but, 
paradoxically, limited the government’s use of unlimited power.  When a single king possessed 
imperium, there was no legal way that anyone could tell him not to do something.  But with the 
imperium granted to two people, they each possessed unlimited power, including the power to 
veto the actions of the other.  These two people would be the consuls.  In the beginning of the 
Republic, the consuls were different from kings only in their term length (one year) and the fact 
that there were two of them.  The Senate remained the same supreme background authority it had 
always been, and the people’s assembly continued to elect executive officials just as they had 
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elected the monarchs, although now there were a few more types of electable magistrates and the 
assembly also now voted on laws. 
 The changes seem few and technical, but they seem to be the first step toward building a 
culture of libertas where once was only imperium.  Even Livy, after praising the advent of 
libertas, admits that Brutus may have gone too far in giving the appearance of libertas in every 
little detail.  He allowed only one consul to carry the fasces at a time, lest the people think that 
there was now double the tyranny; he gave most of the king’s ceremonial duties to a separate 
official called the pontifex maximus; and he even recommended that his fellow consul resign the 
office since he bore the name “Tarquin.” (Livy, 2.2)  Brutus’s paranoia at even the small 
aesthetic details was not completely unjustified.  The Roman Republic was surrounded by 
kingdoms ruled by kings who had an interest in squelching such radical political innovations, 
and there was a serious concern that the Etruscans would bribe their way back into kingship.  As 
odd as it sounds to modern ears, strict ideological conformity was necessary to maintain a state 
that made room for libertas. 
 The existential crisis that arose from being surrounded by opposing regimes may have 
prevented Brutus from enacting as many substantial liberal reforms as he might have envisioned; 
imperium would have regained its former importance in the face of such threats.  Safeguarding 
imperium was so important that even having just two possessors was considered a potential 
Achilles’ heel of the new government.  If the nation was in imminent danger, and both consuls 
vetoed the actions of the other, the government would be hamstrung and unable to protect the 
state.  This concern led to the creation of the position of dictator, a temporary wielder of 
unchecked power whose sole purpose was to steer the nation through crises.  Obviously, this is a 
terribly similar role to that of the king; even with a six-month term length, a dictator could 
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potentially be just as tyrannical as he operates above most of the laws.  The delicate balance 
between imperium and libertas characterizes the specific political institutions of the early days of 
the Republic.  Adcock succinctly explains the disparate motivations of the Republicans: “…the 
Romans contrived to preserve the absolute efficacy of the imperium while providing safeguards 
against the dangers of lasting disunion through plurality and of lasting autocracy through 
indivisibility.”5 
 
Libertas of the Individual 
 The careful separation of powers and maintenance of a strict hierarchy helped to balance 
imperium and libertas on a national level, but what does libertas mean for the common Roman 
citizen?  He ought to be enjoying the simple pleasure of not having an oppressive ruler, but 
theoretically the consuls, dictators, and Senate have just as much potential to encroach upon a 
poor plebeian’s life.  The new culture of libertas, however, becomes not just a check on tyranny 
at the national level, but a protection against oppression on a more interpersonal level.  The first 
concept of inherent individual rights in Roman society has arisen.  Previously, any rights granted 
to the citizens were at the whim of the king, and could be just as whimsically revoked.  But with 
the new cultural emphasis on libertas, the common man now had a baseline for how much 
freedom he possessed merely by virtue of being a Roman citizen.  One of the earliest 
accomplishments in codifying such a sense of rights was the creation of the Twelve Tables in 
450 B.C.E.  As one would expect from a Roman legal document, the Tables are entirely 
practically-oriented; any abstract ideals about freedom and justice must be derived from the 
solutions that the Tables provide for day-to-day disputes.  Many of the Tables deal with property 
rights, which has been a significant foundation for free societies throughout history.  Others 
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provide protocols for remedying interpersonal injuries, laying out specific penalties for stealing 
and forbidding the killing of anyone without a formal trial.  Though rather minimalistic by 
modern standards, this new basic set of expected rights extended “freedom from tyranny” down 
to the most mundane interactions between citizens, preventing people from building pyres less 
than sixty feet from one’s house and introducing harsh penalties for enchanting someone with an 
incantation. 
 The Republic seems to have a solid foundation on which to build a comprehensive 
“freedom from tyranny,” from the checks on imperium to a rudimentary acknowledgment of 
inherent individual rights.  Freedom to participate in government, however, initially seems to be 
roughly the same as during the monarchy.  The Centuriate Assembly and the Tribal Assembly 
were both carried over from the monarchy, though the Republic granted them more power.  
Since they are no longer beholden to a king, the Assemblies now play a larger, more uninhibited 
role in the enacting of legislation.  But the composition of the Assemblies still heavily favors the 
upper-class Romans; citizens with more property and a patrician bloodline are much more likely 
to be able to enact their will in the Assemblies than someone poor or plebeian.  The unequal 
representation of classes in the Assemblies leads to a period of time called the Conflict of the 
Orders, which was either a serious situation of civil strife with multiple plebeian uprisings6 or 
just a series of gradual adjustments to the Roman constitution with little actual conflict,7 
depending on different scholars’ perspectives. However dire the struggle was, it resulted in some 
significant gains for plebeians in the realm of civic participation.  The most notable is the 
creation of the Plebeian Council, a plebs-only Assembly in which there was no (direct) way for 
patricians to trample on the views of the common people. 
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 But most such governmental adjustments still fall more within the purview of freedom 
from tyranny than freedom to participate; with their Council, the plebs are now more protected 
from the potential tyranny of the patricians.  In general, it seems that the early Republican 
Romans valued freedom from tyranny much more than freedom to participate.  Though the 
Roman people used to vote for their king, the position most similar to a king in breadth of power, 
the dictator, is appointed without the will of the people.  It would seem that giving up the ability 
to vote in that case is considered an easy price to pay for severely restricted term lengths.  In few 
areas was the use of popular elections expanded during the transition to Republic; the system 
remained rather rigidly hierarchical, with the Senate remaining above and behind all other 
aspects of government.  It would seem that Lucius Junius Brutus made the Roman state so 
antagonistic, both culturally and institutionally, toward tyranny that voting and other forms of 
political participation never came to be seen as necessary for the protection of libertas.  If 
anything, it was the system of voting in the Assemblies that caused most of the plebeians’ 
anxiety, worried that the patricians were becoming a collective tyrant.  The Roman idea of 
libertas, in preventing incidents of tyranny on the large scale, also gave the Roman people a 
sense of trust in their government, lessening the need for mass direct political participation. 
 In his outsider’s perspective on the Roman state, the Greek historian Polybius describes 
the unique Roman situation in a way that captures the apparent tension between executive 
imperium and the participation of the citizens.  He portrays the Roman state as a combination of 
the three archetypal government types: rule by the one, rule by the few, and rule by the many. 
“For if one fixed one's eyes on the power of the consuls, the constitution seemed completely 
monarchical and royal; if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic; and when one 
looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a democracy.” (Polybius, Histories, 
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6.11)  Although the consuls and Senate seem to have almost unlimited power in their respective 
spheres, Polybius places great emphasis on the power of the people as the lynchpin that holds 
Roman society together.  Besides the aforementioned legislative duties, the Roman people 
“bestow office on the deserving, the noblest regard of virtue in a state… Thus here again one 
might plausibly say that the people's share in the government is the greatest, and that the 
constitution is a democratic one.” (Polybius, Hist., 6.14)  Polybius sees the imbuement of the 
government with virtue as the most noteworthy effect of Roman democracy.  The relationship 
between virtue and government will be investigated further in the final chapter, but insofar as 
increased public virtue was a notable benefit to the Roman Republic, the detriment of its absence 
in the following two cases ought to be considered. 
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Chapter Two: Failures of Modern Democratic Transitions 
 The Roman transition from monarchy to republic was remarkable in its swiftness, 
originality, and resulting stability.  The Republic lasted for nearly 500 years; after that much 
time, it seems safe to conclude that its collapse was not due to some inherent weakness in their 
governing institutions.  Such a transition from an authoritarian government to a free society 
ought to be even easier in modern times, since we have contemplated democratic political 
philosophy for centuries and there is a good handful of countries with stable traditions of 
individual liberty.  One might think that any modern country attempting to transition to a 
republican form of government should be able to simply institute copies of the democratic 
institutions that have worked so well in other established democracies. 
 However, since the end of World War II, the success rate of such democratic transitions 
has been hit-or-miss.  Many developing countries have cast off their colonial overlords or local 
monarchs and attempted to instantly take up the democratic institutions that have worked so well 
in some of the world’s most powerful countries.  But their role models, countries like the United 
States and Great Britain, took centuries of growing pains to reach the fully operational 
democracies that they are today; the sudden transitions in many developing countries seem to 
lack certain stabilizing factors that the developed democracies took a long time to achieve.  
 One of those stabilizing factors might be the gradual introduction of popular voting into 
established republics.  Electoral systems are often seen as the most essential aspect of 
democracy, and thus are one of the first institutions created when a modern country declares 
itself to be a democracy.  It is evident that many societies in the world have elections and are 
patently not democracies; sham elections are often implemented by openly authoritarian regimes 
in order not to appear completely deviant from international norms. 
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 But many well-intentioned electoral systems also seem prone to rapidly devolve into a 
less-than-free society.  Though the voting is relatively free and fair, the resulting governments 
seem to take the support of the people as a mandate to ignore constitutional restrictions and favor 
consolidating their own imperium over the libertas of the populace.  By the time the people 
become frustrated with the elected ruler, the demagogue has gained enough power to influence 
the electoral system and maintain his power indefinitely. 
 By this point, formal democracy has been abandoned, and the people often turn to the 
military to use raw force to change the regime.  After successfully overthrowing the elected 
leader, the military then installs a new president for the restored “democracy,” legitimized by the 
people’s support of the military.  In such scenarios, the monolithic “people’s will” is wielded by 
those in power like a blank check; the government is a democracy insofar as its imperium is 
derived from the people, but the individual citizens have no power left to influence those 
governing them.  The pendulum of governing philosophy has swung from a monarch whose 
power is completely removed from the populace to a series of dictators whose legitimacy is 
drawn from some impersonal, collective spirit of “the people.”  Somewhere in the transition from 
one extreme to the other, the ideas of individual liberty and political efficacy were passed over 
and discarded. 
 Although there are many additional factors that influence the success or failure of nascent 
democracies, this chapter will focus on the contributions of voting itself to the stability or chaos 
of specific democratic regimes in the past century.  After becoming independent sovereign 
nations, countries such as Zimbabwe, Cambodia, South Sudan, and South Vietnam attempted to 
establish democratic institutions.  All of these four cases either failed or are currently failing to 
maintain stable and free democratic governments.  For two of these cases, I will examine the role 
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of voting in the initial selection of the regime as well as the particular moment when the 




 Zimbabwe’s transition to a sovereign democratic government was not a clean-cut 
transformation from pure autocracy to democracy.  In 1965, a white minority in the country 
declared independence from Great Britain under the name Rhodesia.  Rhodesia had all the 
ingredients of a republic, with a parliamentary system and voting and a codification of equal 
rights.  However, the requirements for eligible voters were constructed so that the black majority 
of the country would be excluded, giving most of the governing authority to the white minority.  
Though nominally a democracy, Rhodesia was clearly in the hands of an oligarchical white 
minority.  The prime minister, Ian Smith, and his party held onto power for the entirety of the 
government’s 15-year lifespan.  His administration showed no intention of implementing 
universal suffrage, despite urging by Great Britain, who saw “majority rule” as necessary for 
newly independent colonies. 
 Such a concentration of power with the outward appearance of democracy seems to 
resemble the voting of the Roman people for their monarchs, who were confirmed by the 
unelected Senate.  With the black majority chafing under the oligarchic oppression, the Republic 
of Rhodesia eventually yielded to majority rule after a costly war against several revolutionary 
guerilla armies.  But simple concessions to the majority were not enough; the entire Rhodesian 
governing system was thrown out, and the new country Zimbabwe was formed with an entirely 
new democratic government. 
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 The initial creation of Zimbabwe seems like a carefully planned and designed 
implementation of a well-oiled democracy.  The official terms of Zimbabwean independence 
were overseen and officially recognized by Great Britain.  A constitution was drawn up, creating 
a House of Assembly comprised of 100 members, 20 of which were reserved for white elected 
officials.  In 1980, the first elections were held, overseen by British officials and approved by the 
international community.  
 When he was deposed in late 2017 after 37 years of rule, the Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe was the world’s oldest living head of state.  In the late 1970s, he entered politics 
as the leader of one of the victorious guerilla armies in the war against the Rhodesian 
government, and was therefore hailed as the hero of the revolution by his country’s people.  Just 
as Lucius Junius Brutus led the Roman people to freedom and was then elected their first consul, 
Mugabe’s election as Zimbabwe’s first prime minister makes sense as the outcome of the 
country’s first act of voting.  Since this was the first time that the black majority of Zimbabwe 
had the power to influence their national governing officials, it was only natural that they would 
vote for a party and a leader whose platform focused on giving power to the majority.  The new 
electoral system, with its universal suffrage, seemed to directly result in the expansion of 
personal liberty. 
 Once in power, however, Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU), began to bend democracy to their will.  Although competing political parties are 
usually a sign of a healthy democracy, relations quickly became heated between the ZANU, the 
white minority Rhodesian Front, and another revolutionary party called the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU).  Political and ethnic differences came to a head in 1983.  In an event 
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called Gukurahundi, ZANU-affiliated paramilitary troops murdered tens of thousands of 
“political dissidents” allegedly connected to ZAPU over the course of several months.8 
 What happened?  The liberty that was supposed to be granted by a democratic form of 
government seems to have run out after only a few years of Zimbabwean sovereignty.  The 
elections of 1980, so carefully set up and successfully carried out, somehow resulted in more 
oppression, not less.  The system of checks and balances, so important in the Roman Republic, 
seem to be broken in the case of Zimbabwe.  If a government leader breaks the law, a citizen of a 
free society would expect the police or military to arrest him and enforce the law.  But what 
happens when the bearers of military force simply go along with whatever the leader says?  
Mugabe, as a former military leader, seems to have had enough sway with his old troops that 
they were more willing to follow his commands than obey the restrictions of a constitution 
created through compromise with their rivals. 
 Does it take only one charismatic leader and a group of loyal followers to throw a wrench 
in democracy?  So far, it would seem so.  But the massacre of Gukurahundi, however heinous 
and unthinkable, was still carried out by a democratically-elected government, chosen by the 
people from among several competing political parties.  It is not until 1987 that the democratic 
institutions in Zimbabwe begin to thoroughly crumble.  Despite their previous disputes, the 
ZANU and ZAPU parties reconciled by combining their parties into the Zimbabwe African 
National Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).  Since they were already the two largest parties, the new 
combined party would seem to eliminate any possibility of other parties competing with ZANU-
PF for governing power.  By itself, though, the creation of a vastly dominant political party is not 
necessarily the death knell of democratic freedom; plenty of parliamentary governments in other 
countries can get things done only when competing parties form large coalitions to pass 
                                                 
8 Mashingaidze 2005. 
25 
 
legislation.  The truly anti-democratic aspect of the situation is explicitly stated in the Unity 
Accord, the agreement which formed the ZANU-PF.  Among other declarations of intent, the 
sixth statement announces, “That ZANU-PF shall seek to establish a one-party state in 
Zimbabwe.” (Unity Accord, 1987) 
 This blatant disregard for competing political positions removes any last hope that 
democracy in Zimbabwe would safeguard freedom.  In the same year, Mugabe created the office 
of the president as a separate executive branch, granting himself further governing authority and 
freedom from the parliament.  With such sweeping institutional changes, Zimbabwe would 
become a democracy only in the sense that Mugabe derives his power from the support of his 
followers, and just as he used them to consolidate his power over the decades, so could anyone 
else overthrow Mugabe’s regime with enough of their own loyal supporters. 
 And so the cycle of oppression and violence would continue, with democracy never more 
than a façade.  After struggling for so many years against a government that oppressed one 
portion of the population, President Mugabe swung the pendulum in the other direction.  Since 
white citizens owned a vast majority of the land in Zimbabwe, Mugabe made efforts to 
redistribute the land more equitably.  Unfortunately, his “fast-track land reform” program 
eventually became nothing more than a way to centralize more power; land confiscated from 
white farmers was nationalized and placed under the control of Mugabe loyalists.  After several 
decades of pressuring and harassing white farmers, by 2013 there were no white-owned farms 
left outside the control of the government.9  No compensation was given for the confiscated land, 
and the white farmers were left with nothing. 
 Just as the Rhodesian government excluded the black majority from most political 
participation, the Mugabe administration was able to discriminate against the white minority.  
                                                 
9 “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Zimbabwe.” 2013. 
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This time, however, being in the minority, the white citizens had no hope of successfully 
mounting an armed rebellion, and several attempts to sue the government resulted in the white 
farmers getting beaten up in their homes.  Although there are codified rights and laws that ought 
to have protected the white farmers, there is not much a minority can achieve in the face of a 
majority that believes the minority is getting its just deserts. 
 After being under the rule of a de facto dictator for several decades, however, even the 
majority of Zimbabweans began to tire of Mugabe’s attempts to bend the rules and accomplish 
his goals through force.  In the elections of 2008, a new presidential candidate, Morgan 
Tsvangirai, received the support of the majority.  Mugabe allegedly manipulated the final 
election and reinstalled himself as president, but the will of the people had turned away from 
him.  He and Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing agreement, allowing Mugabe to remain in 
control of the military while the general populace was mollified by having Tsvangirai as prime 
minister. 
 The arrangement shows that the people of Zimbabwe do still have some political clout; 
even if the freedom-ensuring aspects of democracy are gone, the collective will of the people still 
has the ability to affect the governing authority.  But what good is it?  If the Zimbabweans had 
voted Mugabe completely out of power and Tsvangirai assumed the presidency, there seems to 
be no assurance that Tsvangirai would be any less authoritarian than Mugabe.  In the case of 
Zimbabwe, democracy seems to be less “rule by the people” and more “rule by the most popular 
person at the moment.”  Once the people have voted, they seem to give up their political efficacy 
until the next presidential election.  At this point, a government based on voting seems to breed 
just as much oppression and violation of rights as the prior monarchical or colonial 
administrations, and seems to be even less stable. 
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 The removal of Mugabe from power does not seem to have improved the situation in 
Zimbabwe.  His replacement, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was installed after a military coup and is 
nicknamed “The Crocodile” for his cunning political maneuvers and his record of gruesome 
atrocities.  Even an official of the ruling ZANU-PF party expressed concern about the future 
leader: “You think Mugabe is bad, but have you thought that whoever comes after him could be 
even worse?”10  The role of the individual Zimbabwean citizen has been marginalized, and 
though the democracy remains in name, the future of the country seems solidly in the hands of 
those individuals with the most power. 
 
Sihanouk’s Cambodia 
 A similar situation of democracy gone bad occurred in post-colonial Cambodia.  Just as 
Zimbabwe was preceded by a pseudo-republican government, so did Cambodia have voting and 
elected assemblies under French colonial rule.  After achieving independence in 1953, however, 
the Cambodian electoral system became even less free and fair.  Despite the oversight of an 
International Control Commission, the initial elections in the sovereign Kingdom of Cambodia 
provide some of the most blatant examples of disregard for the individual rights and freedoms 
that we have come to expect from democracy. 
 The king of Cambodia, Norodum Sihanouk, stepped down from the figurehead position 
in order to directly participate in the first elections in 1955.  He formed his own right-wing 
political party, the Sangkum, in order to combat the popular Democrats.  Sihanouk then 
proceeded to use his influence as former king to intimidate the voters and manipulate election 
results.  Many voters were not allowed to cast secret ballots, instead casting votes with colored 
pieces of paper in view of Sihanouk’s police force.  The Sangkum won with a suspicious 83% of 
                                                 
10 “Emmerson Mnangagwa: The 'crocodile' who snapped back.” BBC World News, 2018. 
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the vote and gained all the seats in the assembly, effectively taking complete control of the 
government. 
 With the right amount of charisma and personal supporters, it would appear to take only a 
single brief occurrence of electoral democracy for a demagogue to coopt the entire government.  
Sihanouk carried much gravitas as the former monarch who gained Cambodia’s independence, 
and his Sangkum party platform was extremely nationalistic.  Writing in 1967, Smith describes 
the relationship between Sihanouk and the Cambodian people: “So much has Sihanouk identified 
himself with his country and people that any criticism of them is regarded by him as a personal 
affront, and any attack on him is considered as an insult to Cambodia's dignity and honor.”11 
 If the people truly did love him as a leader, then was the Cambodian democracy a 
success?  Just as in Zimbabwe, Cambodian democracy succeeded only in selecting a ruler with 
an incredible amount of sway among the majority (though with such fraudulent elections, the 
will of the actual majority is difficult to determine).  Though Sihanouk seemed to have 
widespread support, it helped that he brutally harassed and intimidated leading members of the 
opposing Democratic party.  Within two years of the first elections, the Democrats had 
disbanded as a political party, with the last few leaders begging to be admitted into the Sangkum. 
 To further solidify his authority, Sihanouk emphasized the nationalistic aspects of 
Buddhism, the majority religion in Cambodia.  The idea was to encourage the wealthy to give to 
the poor, but in practice the wealth was seized by the state and then distributed to Sihanouk’s 
loyalists, in much the same way that Mugabe “redistributed” white farmers’ land in Zimbabwe.  
By playing different segments of society against each other, both rulers were able to reward the 
loyalty of their supporters and utterly marginalize their opponents. 
                                                 
11 Smith 1967. 
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 After proclaiming himself permanent Head of State and becoming increasingly brutal in 
silencing political dissidents, Sihanouk was eventually deposed in a military coup.  Cambodia 
was then plunged into a multi-faceted civil war, and all semblance of democracy disappeared 
with the victory of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. 
 
How Do Democracies Survive? 
 With Zimbabwe and Cambodia as our examples, it would seem that democracies are a 
disturbingly tenuous form of government.  In each case, the groundwork for a democracy was 
laid quite meticulously.  Each country had legislative assemblies, multiple political parties, a 
constitution, and laws protecting the rights of its citizens.  The initial elections in both countries 
were even supervised by an international third party to ensure fairness. 
 In both cases, the elections were won by the party of the leader who gained the country’s 
independence.  There is nothing ostensibly wrong with the people voting into power a person 
whom they believe will be a good leader; in fact, that seems to be the best outcome that a popular 
democracy can hope to achieve.  But this best-case scenario does not prevent these national 
heroes from becoming demagogues, using the mandate of the people to perform whatever actions 
suit them. 
 Are there not checks and balances included in the building blocks of democracy that were 
present in these countries?  Theoretically, the legislative assembly should have some sort of 
power to restrict the actions of the executive.  The judiciary, likewise, should have the power to 
point out when the legislature or executive are out of line with regards to the constitution.  And 
finally, the military and police ought to be subordinate to the duly elected government and not 
take it upon themselves to “fix” the government by force. 
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 In the face of such catastrophic governmental failures, however, these checks seem like 
pure wishful thinking.  As soon as some really charismatic person and their party of diehard 
followers gains a majority of power, the whole system falls apart.  When all the “separate” 
powers are working toward the same goal, there is no reason to restrict the power of another 
branch.  The legislators know that the executive is working in their interest, and the military 
know that the leader will use his power to “redistribute” the country’s wealth in their favor.  A 
few choice minorities end up trampled, but the majority of the populace remains complacent, 
happy with their choice of administration and confident in their ability to change things the next 
time an election comes around (though by then it will probably be too late). 
 Thus it would seem that democracies are only as democratic as the current administration 
wants them to be, and voting seems to lead the populace into a false sense of political efficacy.  
If a popular government comes into power and decides to outright ignore the constitution, there 
seems to be nothing that can prevent such a decision.  There may be some public outcry, but the 
administration has the support of the majority, and the military can silence any dissidents.  
Though it sounds extremely cynical, it seems like the success of a democracy depends entirely 
on whether or not the citizens and administration decide to act like it is a free democracy.  If 
even just one influential person decides to treat their country like their own personal monarchy, 




Chapter 3: The Value of Democracy 
 From the examples in previous chapters, it can be seen that democracies can last 
hundreds of years or fizzle out in an instant.  Representative government is hailed for its inherent 
stability, yet seems just as vulnerable to chaotic regime change and authoritarianism as any other 
government structure.  When comparing the successes and failures of different democratic 
regimes, it can be difficult to fully separate the outcomes from the specific circumstances under 
which the government operated.  Though the individual cases offer concrete examples of 
democracy’s benefits and shortcomings, such pros and cons must now be examined in the 
abstract. 
 Determining the worth of democratic government in general first requires the answering 
of a few philosophical questions.  First, what is the purpose of government?  If an objective 
purpose of government can be agreed upon, then the structures of various forms of government 
can be judged according to how well they align with that general purpose.  Is democracy the 
form of government which best effects the purpose of government?  And if it is not, what 
changes ought to be made to it? 
 Aristotle and John Stuart Mill both propose intriguing answers to these questions.  
Despite being separated by thousands of years of history, each philosopher provides methodical 
analyses of the issues of democratic government irrespective of any specific historical regime.  
Their explanations of the purpose of government are particularly potent because each is founded 
on that philosopher’s peculiar system of ethics.  We might expect, therefore, that Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics and Mill’s utilitarianism would produce vastly different premises for a purpose of 
government.  However, both Aristotle and Mill base their ethical systems on the inherent value 




Aristotle’s Virtuous Purpose 
 The link between happiness and the purpose of government in Aristotle is not 
immediately evident in his writings and requires some explanation.  For a book primarily 
concerned with how people ought to interact in community with each other, Aristotle’s Politics 
spends little time discussing what makes individual humans happy.  At first glance, Aristotle’s 
humans can seem like mindless cogs in the machine of society.  So what place does happiness 
have in Aristotle’s view of politics?  Despite his limited explanation of happiness itself, many of 
Aristotle’s ideas would work only in a world where humans make choices based on what would 
benefit them the most.  Though Aristotle describes it using objective, impersonal terms like 
“virtue” and “best,” his political philosophy is founded on the idea that each human yearns to 
work toward higher happiness. 
 First, let us examine Aristotle’s connection between happiness and the “best” things.  
Aristotle’s main goal seems to be to create the best possible city with the best possible regime 
ruling the best possible people.  But what does he mean by “best”?  At one point, Aristotle 
discusses the possibility that the most choiceworthy regime is the best.  This seems like a direct 
appeal to human happiness: whatever one desires, it is best to have.  And at first it seems like this 
version of “best” would be a relative term; surely the Spartans believed that their military 
oligarchy was the best regime, and other nations consider their own regime the best, leaving no 
measure for an objectively best regime.  But Aristotle explains that the Spartans incorrectly 
believe that domination over others to be choiceworthy.  He refutes this domineering sense of the 
word “best” when he claims that, “to assign what is not equal to equal persons and what is not 
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similar to similar persons is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble.” (Politics 
7.3.1325b8-10) 
 So the best things are still the most choiceworthy, but Aristotle has narrowed the 
definition of what is truly choiceworthy: a choiceworthy action is in accordance with nature and 
strives toward higher goals.  Actions based on a desire to hold power over other human beings 
are not worthy of choice because it goes against our nature, which urges us to strive for things 
which will give higher pleasures.  Does this stifle the human yearning for happiness at all, by 
restricting desires to only “natural” and “noble” ventures?  Aristotle would disagree, for the 
nobler pursuits of happiness are worth far more than any low brutish desire for dominance.  But 
nonetheless, humans seem to have such contra-natural desires anyway, distracting them from 
their longing for greater happiness.  To discourage ignoble choices and encourage noble ones, 
Aristotle relies on virtue. 
 Virtue, as described by Aristotle, is the means by which the common man can achieve the 
greatest happiness and the best things.  Rather than assuming humans will automatically become 
idealistic nationalists when placed in a political environment, Aristotle knows that humans will 
work the best when they are working for their own good and happiness.  He is so sure of this that 
he declares it “evident” in order to use it as a premise for the rest of the discussion: “Now that 
everyone strives for living well and for happiness is evident.” (Pol. 7.13.1331b40)  To focus this 
innate yearning for nobler living, Aristotle lays out a two-step process in order to guide people 
from their barbaric lives of unfocused passions toward a life lived well: “…one of these is in the 
correct positing of the aim and end of actions; the other, discovering the actions that bear on the 
end.” (Pol. 7.13.1331b29-30)  It has already been established that the ultimate end is happiness, 
and Aristotle claims this can be achieved by living virtuously. 
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 But simply being told that one must be virtuous to be happy is often not enough to 
convince one to take action toward becoming virtuous.  Aristotle explains that people must be 
reasoned with so that they realize the greater happiness that can be gained by living virtuously.  
According to Aristotle, there are three things by which man becomes excellent in virtue: nature, 
habit, and reason.  With regards to nature, someone must “develop naturally as a human being 
and not some of the other animals.” (Pol. 7.13.1332a41-42)  Presumably this is required so that 
the person possesses the peculiar innate longing for greater happiness.  If they have this inherent 
desire, then “living virtuously” becomes a matter of honing this desire for higher things through 
habit: “certain qualities are ambiguous in their nature, and through habits develop in the direction 
of worse or better.” (Pol. 7.13.1332b2-4)  Once a human reaches adulthood, most of their 
conceptions of what makes them happy are set in habit. 
 But through reason, humans can still work towards nobler goals and higher happiness 
which they have not yet made into habit: “For men act in many ways contrary to their 
habituation and their nature through reason, if they are persuaded that some condition is better.” 
(Pol. 7.13.1332b6-8)  So while it is clear that all well-developed and habituated humans want to 
perform actions which will move them toward the end goal of highest happiness, they may have 
disordered ends and be working toward a lower form of happiness without realizing it.  
Aristotle’s solution to misguided happiness-seeking humans is education.  He believes that if 
children are educated with a view to the noblest of ends and the actions and virtues which will 
take them there, they will certainly choose to live virtuously as adults, since the highest 
happiness is always choiceworthy once people are pointed in its direction. 
 Keeping in mind this premise that people will choose higher goals over baser desires, we 
must see why they would choose to live in a city and how the best city stands in relation to 
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happiness.  Aristotle asserts in one definition of the city that “…the city is a community of 
similar persons, for the sake of a life that is the best possible.” (Pol. 7.8.1328a35-36)  Assuming 
that these similar persons all have a view to the higher good, the city itself will be directed 
toward noble goals.  With this in mind, then, the best city is the one in which every citizen is 
encouraged to live virtuously. 
 Aristotle contrasts this ideal version of a city with the contemporary cities of Greece, 
which are not made up of people who are similar in virtue.  The contemporary cities are made up 
of many people of differing views with regards to what is choiceworthy and what will make 
them happy.  Therefore, the Greek cities do what seems immediately best in such a situation: 
they focus on the things that are evidently useful to all citizens, and ignore nobler goals which 
must be discerned through education.  The Greek cities in this way encourage happiness, but 
only in the forms which immediately appeal to their citizens’ baser conceptions of happiness.  
Sparta, Aristotle’s perennial example of a seemingly-successful city, focuses primarily on honing 
the natural drive toward warfare in its citizens.  Fighting and conquest is easily seen as a good 
thing because domination provides happiness, but since they have focused solely on that and 
neglected nobler goals, the Spartans have been stunted in their approach to happiness and are not 
on the virtuous path to higher goals.  If we are trying to create the best possible city, as Aristotle 
describes, then it must be focused on encouraging and developing noble virtues in its citizens in 
order for them to attain the highest happiness. 
 
Virtue in Democracy 
 So if the purpose of government is to cultivate virtuous excellence, how well does 
democracy carry out such a task?  Although he lives in democratic Athens, Aristotle has some 
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serious misgivings about the effectiveness of democracy as an agent of virtue and producer of 
happiness.  In his description of the different types of possible constitutions, Aristotle places 
democracy on a spectrum of “government by the many.”  At one end of the spectrum is “polity,” 
which he defines as the many ruling for the sake of the common interest.  Presumably this 
common interest is the highest happiness previously mentioned.  On the other end of this 
spectrum is what Aristotle calls “democracy,” the many ruling for their own self-interest.  He 
claims that the self-centered goal of a democratic regime is a perversion of the morally-good and 
selfless polity regime. 
 This distinction between common and self-interest ought to raise eyebrows.  If we are to 
take Aristotle’s thoughts on virtue seriously, then such a distinction between common interest 
and self-interest should be nonexistent.  Both the common interest and individual self-interest 
ought to be striving for the highest happiness.  Thus, a regime directed toward the common 
interest and a regime directed toward many different individual interests ought to be 
indistinguishable in their actions and policies. 
 Since Aristotle does draw a distinction, however, it must be assumed that such self-
interest is not merely the striving of an individual toward the highest good, but rather the 
fulfillment of an individual’s baser desires.  A society based on such fulfillment could rightfully 
be distinguished from a regime that focused on the common good, since the former would result 
in the chaotic fulfillment of whatever whims each individual might have.  And since individuals 
are often selfish, only a polity focused on the common interest would be able to promote the 
highest happiness in every individual.  Though he recognizes and criticizes the weaknesses of 
democracy, Aristotle seems to believe that such a certain type of democratic regime could still 




Mill’s Virtuous Purpose 
 John Stuart Mill comes to a conclusion similar to Aristotle’s with regard to the purpose of 
government.  After discarding several popular notions of the goal of government, Mill gets to the 
root of what allows any government to operate: the quality of its citizens.  He explains that no 
government can reach any end without its citizens performing their duties in accordance with the 
regime’s institutions.  Mill offers examples of the many ways in which any government 
institution would fail if its constituent citizens decided to ignore procedure and do as they please: 
“How can a representative assembly work for good if its members…, uncorrected by public 
discipline or private self-control, …resort to manual violence on the floor of the House, or shoot 
at one another with rifles?” (Mill, Considerations, Ch. 2)  In the same way that government in 
general is contrived solely by humans working in community, specific regimes only work if 
humans agree to make them work. 
 In this way, Mill arrives at his own ultimate goal of government, which bears a striking 
resemblance to that of Aristotle: “…the most important point of excellence which any form of 
government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.” 
(Mill, Cons., Ch. 2)  Mill’s concept of higher and lower pleasures is almost identical to 
Aristotle’s ideas concerning noble and base desires, and thus Mill comes to the same conclusion: 





Virtue in Representative Democracy 
 Though Mill and Aristotle agree on the purpose of government, Mill has some notable 
disagreements with Aristotle about the best form of government.  In Aristotle’s explanation of 
the various constitutions, he suggests that the “good” forms of rule by one, the few, and the many 
are all relatively equally valid as methods of achieving the highest good.  Monarchy is as good as 
aristocracy, and aristocracy is as good as polity, as long as they do not slip into tyranny, 
oligarchy, or democracy, respectively.  Mill, however, takes a strong stance against rule by the 
one or the few in favor of rule by the many. 
 Mill begins by dismissing the popular idea of a beneficent monarch as the ideal form of 
government. (Mill, Cons., Ch. 3)  He points out that, even if such a ruler existed and was 
practically able to rule a state directly and alone, such a regime would be detrimental to the 
general citizenry.  Mill explains that placing all the concerns of the nation in the power of one 
man reduces the rest of the citizens to passive observers, unable to make their own decisions and 
thereby live virtuous lives.  Though they may have their baser desires sated by the beneficence of 
the monarch, their moral efficacy has been removed and they would be unable to cultivate their 
higher, more preferable faculties. 
 Therefore, Mill places high value on political participation.  He sees a fully participatory 
democracy as the only way in which the entirety of the population can exercise their political 
wills and work toward general virtue.  Mill argues that without such participation, citizens would 
probably never look beyond their own self-interest and consider themselves as part of a greater 
community.  And if the citizens are purely self-interested, then the government cannot perform in 
accordance with its goal of encouraging virtue and the highest happiness.  Thus, democracy is 
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the best way to ensure that people have the ability and moral duty to individually pursue the 
highest good. 
 Despite his ringing endorsement of popular sovereignty, Mill does acknowledge the 
potential weaknesses of a democratic government.  Though rather than blaming the symptoms, 
such as tyranny of the majority or election of a demagogue, Mill addresses what he believes to be 
the root of those problems: the inability of the citizenry to responsibly handle liberty.  “When the 
people are too much attached to savage independence to be tolerant of the amount of power to 
which it is for their good that they should be subject, the state of society… is not yet ripe for 
representative government.” (Mill, Cons., Ch. 6)  At first it seems strange that such a strong 
proponent of individual liberty should start pointing fingers at “savage independence,” but Mill 
distinguishes between the two types of freedom that have been discussed earlier: freedom from 
oppression, and freedom to participate in government. 
 Mill never places freedom from oppression in any doubt; he has no issues with personal 
protections against the government.  However, despite his promotion of full participatory 
government, Mill acknowledges that there must be limits on the scope of this freedom to 
participate.  If people hold their ability to participate politically as their highest value, they will 
be unwilling to allow any institution of government to effectively wield power over them.  As 
soon as an institution is put in place to exercise governmental authority, a savagely independent 
people might become suspicious of the institution and use their newfound political power to 
undermine it.  Thus, a potentially significant factor in the success or failure of democratic 





 The political philosophies of Aristotle and Mill might shed some light on the intriguing 
cases of Republican Rome and modern Zimbabwe and Cambodia.  Each state attempted to create 
a democratic government, but Rome was far more successful than the other two.  Setting aside 
historical and circumstantial factors, was there any inherent difference in their implementations 
of democratic government that could have contributed to the states’ success or failure? 
 Aristotle and Mill suggest that the intended purpose of the government can be a 
significant factor in the success of the regime.  The best government, according to their ethical 
philosophies, is that which encourages the whole community to strive for virtue and the highest 
happiness.  Freedom is a necessary part of living a virtuous life; without freedom, one is unable 
to make moral choices and actively strive toward nobler things.  Democracy is the form of 
government most conducive to freedom (and, according to Mill, the only option that allows true 
freedom), so it seems to be the obvious frontrunner for best possible regime. 
 Freedom, however, is like food.  It is necessary to live a good life, and it makes us happy.  
But gluttony is looked down upon as the satisfaction of a base desire, and no moralist would 
suggest that food is the ultimate good in life.  In the same way, freedom gives us the agency to 
live virtuous lives and attain happiness, but our appetite for freedom is not one of the nobler 
pleasures.  Therefore, freedom should not be placed on the pedestal of the highest good, and 
ought not be considered the purpose of government. 
 Perhaps, then, democratic governments’ success or failure is dependent on whether they 
view public virtue or freedom as their highest good.  The Roman Republic, created in the instant 
after one of its most public symbols of virtue was brutally raped, clearly decided that the virtue 
of the community was a worthy reason for discarding the old regime and installing a new form of 
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government.  The Romans did not seem to create a Republic for the sake of individuals’ freedom 
to participate, but rather used the ability of citizens to participate to ensure that the regime 
continued to encourage communal virtue.  Libertas was not enshrined as a replacement for 
imperium, but as an instrument to keep imperium focused on the virtuous purpose of the 
Republic. 
 Many modern democracies, however, seem to have founded their system of government 
on the idea of replacing all authority with the free participation of the people.  Unfortunately, as 
Mill pointed out, the concept of government relies on the ultimate exercise of authority by some 
certain institution.  At worst, the free political participation of all individuals becomes simply 
anarchy, and at best large numbers of people throw their political weight behind a single 
demagogue.  Mugabe gave many Zimbabweans the political satisfaction that they desired in the 
moment, but the regime lacked a focus on the higher communal good and could not maintain a 
free society.  Sihanouk demonstrated that the institution of voting should not be hailed as an end 
in itself, since it can be manipulated by nefarious parties; rather, democracy requires a substantial 
commitment on the part of all citizens to creating a virtuous political community.  Cambodia’s 
experiences emphasize Mill’s premise regarding the foundation of government: governments are 
made up by humans, and can work only when humans decide to go along with them. 
 Despite the many pessimistic claims in this essay, it will conclude on a hopeful note.  
Though individual democracies may fail, we can take heart in the idea that humanity has reached 
the point where we can experiment with (according to Mill) the best possible regime, 
representative democratic government.  The fact that democratic institutions do not guarantee a 
successful government by their very nature does not mean that democracy itself is a faulty 
system; rather, given the cases outlined in this paper, it would seem that the fault lies in people’s 
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misguided use of democracy.  Of course, there are a multitude of other possible reasons for the 
collapse of democratic governments, and simply orienting the regime toward the encouragement 
of virtue certainly does not guarantee success.  But insofar as a sense of virtue balances the 
government’s need for authority and the people’s desire for freedom, virtue seems to be 
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